Those who study history regularly ask the question –what if? What if certain watershed events in American history had never occurred or had occurred much differently?
One such watershed event was the war in Vietnam.
Historians to this day ask what if decisions made on escalating or de-escalating that war had been made by President John Kennedy and not by President Lyndon Johnson.
Military historian Fred Kaplan makes a compelling case that if Kennedy had not been assassinated in November 1963, the outcome and duration of that war would have been much different.
Kaplan bases his case on Kennedy’s actions and decisions during the biggest crisis of his presidency, the Cuban Missile Crisis.
Prior to that crisis, Kennedy’s leadership capabilities were challenged regularly by his opponents. They were especially scornful of his disastrous Bay of Pig invasion of Cuba in April 1961 and his disastrous summit meeting with Russian Premier Nikita Khrushchev in June 1961.
Following that summit, Kennedy privately acknowledged, “he just beat the hell out of me.”
Perhaps those two events emboldened Khrushchev to place Soviet medium and long-range nuclear missiles in Cuba in October 1962.
That decision resulted a thirteen-day period where World War Three between America and the Soviet Union was more likely than ever before or since.
The fact that it did not is a testament to Kenndy’s masterful leadership skills.
When Kennedy was made aware of the grave threat from nuclear missiles less than 90 miles from America, he assembled a group of civilian and military advisors to evaluate and oversee an appropriate American response.
Those advisors included the eight members of the military’s Joint Chiefs of Staff, National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy, Defense Secretary Robert McNamara, Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Undersecretary of State George Ball, and Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy.
With one exception (George Ball), Kennedy’s advisors strongly supported direct military action, including bombing the missile sites and invading Cuba.
After thirteen days of a tense standoff between the two superpowers, Khrushchev secretly and unexpectedly offered a deal to end the crisis. The deal terms were Russia would remove their nuclear missiles in Cuba that were pointed at American targets if America would remove American nuclear missiles in Turkey pointed at targets in the Soviet Union.
Kennedy’s advisors, with one exception (Ball), vehemently opposed the deal. They continued to support plans drawn up by the military and Defense Secretary Mac Namara that called for five hundred conventional bombing sorties of the Soviet missile sites and air bases daily for seven days, followed by an invasion of Cuba.
Following receipt of the Khrushchev offer, McGeorge Bundy bluntly told Kennedy, “I think we should tell you … the universal assessment of everyone in the government who’s connected with the alliance problem (NATO) is that if we appear to be trading the defense of Turkey for the threat in Cuba, we will face a radical decline.” Secretary MacNamara ended his review of suggested next steps with “before we attack Cuba.”
After listening to his advisor’s opinions, Kennedy told them, “I’m just thinking about what we’re going to have to do in a day or so. … Five hundred sorties … and possibly an invasion, all because we wouldn’t take missiles out of Turkey. And we all know how quickly everybody’s courage goes when the blood starts to flow, and that’s what’s going to happen in NATO … when we start these things and the Soviets grab Berlin, and everybody’s going to say, ‘Well, this Khrushchev offer was a pretty good proposition.”
Kennedy also knew that the American missiles in Turkey were rapidly becoming obsolete and had no long-term military value to America.
He told his advisors calmly but resolutely that he was sending his brother Bobby (who bitterly opposed the deal) to tell the Soviet ambassador to the United States that America was accepting the Khrushchev proposal.
It was a moment reminiscent of a Cabinet Meeting in the White House 100 years earlier when President Lincoln polled his cabinet members on his proposed new battle strategy for the Civil war. Every member of Lincolns Cabinet voted no. Lincoln said, “I vote aye. The ayes win.”
Kennedy obviously knew that as commander-in-chief, he could overrule his advisors when he chose to do so.
Following Kennedy’s assassination, Lyndon Johnso was either unwilling or unable to overrule his advisors on their repeated calls to escalate the war in Vietnam. Ironically, many of those advisors (except again George Ball) repeatedly advised Johnson for escalation in Vietnam were the same advisors overruled by Kennedy during the Cuban missile crisis.
Kaplan’s answer to the what-if question about the course of the Vietnam War is that LBJ plunged deeply into the war, and JFK would not have.
Based on Kaplan’s analysis of what if JFK had lived, America would have avoided the great tragedy of a futile and immensely divisive war that resulted in more than 58,000 American deaths and countless veterans returning home with post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD).
I agree.
David Reel is a public relations and public affairs consultant who lives in Easton.
Reed Fawell 3 says
I vote aye, said Lincoln. Was Lincoln’s decision the right one? If so, why? If not, why? Will we ever know?
David Reel says
In a word yes. Lincoln was increasingly frustrated withe lack of aggressiveness of his generals. U.S. Grant was a somewhat controversial figure as he oversaw huge Union casualties Union battle loss at the battle of Shiloh and faced persistent rumors (never confirmed) that he drank to excess. Despite that Lincoln said “I can’t spare this man. He fights.” After elevating Grant to lead the Union troops Grant planned and led efforts that resulted in Confederate battle loses and retreats that ultimately led to their unconditional surrender leading to U.S Grant being known as “Unconditional Surrender” Grant.
Brice Gamber says
David – I’d like to think you are right. It would have saved thousands of lives and perhaps shored up a foreign policy that was shaky at best.
However, having spent a year of combat there in the mid 60’s, when we still thought it was a “just war”, I feel the obfuscation and dissembling was so great that even Kennedy would have difficulty getting at the truth
David D Reel says
Brice, You may be right. Kennedy responded to a news reporter’s question once with — “How do you evaluate all the information presented to you in making good decisions?” Kennedy replied “I always ask ‘What am I not being told?’ We will never know how aggressively he would have asked that question re escalation of the Vietnam war, or if did, how successful he would have been in cutting through the great obfuscation and disassembling of the truth that occurred then then and continues through today.
Deirdre LaMotte says
Agree. My father was getting a masters at the Navel War College and having fought in WW11 and Korea, was not supportive of US involvement. It had been tough for the French, to say the least.
However, once we committed, one does the job. That was the situation at that time and the military was given their marching orders. He was there 1966-1967.
David Reel says
While in college I was in the Army ROTC program. I remember private and confidential discussions two ROTC instructors who had served in Vietnam. Both said the same thing. They knew the war was unwinnable but they were duty bound to be loyal to their oath to serve. Sadly our political and military “leaders” that repeatedly made bad made decisions were not loyal to all our veterans who served with courage and devotion on a lost cause After the war ended Robert McNamara in writings and interviews expressed regret for his role in the war. Too little, too late. That acknowledgement came after his appointment to be President of the World Bank. Classic case of elites taking care of one of their own.